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In early 1943,
J. Robert Oppenheimer, the newly named
director of the as-yet-un-built nuclear weapons design laboratory at
Los Alamos, had to recruit a scientific staff for a purpose he could
not disclose, at a place he could not specify, for a period he could
not predict. Adding to these ambiguities was that of the status of the
staff - Brig. Gen. Leslie Groves wanted a military laboratory where
scientists served in uniform, a stipulation to which Oppenheimer
originally agreed.
Most of the scientists who had been recruited to
work on defense projects, however, worked for universities under
contract to the Office of Scientific Research and Development (OSRD)
and they were reluctant to don uniforms.
Another difficulty arose from the fact that many
nuclear physicists had already been absorbed by the Radiation
Laboratory at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, which was
developing radar; the Metallurgical Laboratory at the University of
Chicago, which was working on ways of producing and purifying the new
element plutonium that was expected to be one of the nuclear
explosives; and Ernest Lawrence's electromagnetic uranium isotope
separation project at the University of California Radiation
Laboratory in Berkeley.
The teams that had been working on the measurement
of nuclear constants and theoretical calculations at scattered
university sites under Oppenheimer's direction would form the nucleus
of the new laboratory. But it soon became clear that this was not
enough. With Robert Serber, who had returned to the University of
California to help Oppenheimer with the theoretical calculations,
Oppenheimer discussed "whom it might be lovely to have in the team and
how one man's brilliance might mobilize another's rather more
pedestrian abilities," Oppenheimer's secretary, Priscilla Duffield,
recalled. Oppenheimer wrote James Conant, the head of the National
Defense Research Committee (NDRC), at the end of November 1942, "The
job we have to do will not be possible without personnel substantially
greater than we now have available, and I should only be misleading
you and all others concerned with the É project if I were to promise
to get the work done without this help."
In an early recruiting effort, Oppenheimer drafted
the team led by
Robert Wilson at Princeton that had been working on an
electromagnetic isotope separation scheme called the isotron. This
team was under the direction of Henry Smyth, a physics professor at
Princeton. Lawrence, convinced that his calutron electromagnetic
separation system would be more successful, had closed down the
project. Wilson recalled, "We became then what I suppose is the worst
of all possible things, a research team without a problem, a group
with lots of spirit and technique, but nothing to do. Like a bunch of
professional soldiers, we signed up, en masse, to go to Los Alamos."
Unfortunately, no one had told their former
commander. Smyth protested to Conant about the highjacking of his best
physicists, and Conant told Oppenheimer that henceforth he would
approach department heads and laboratory directors before Oppenheimer
made his raids. "Once we got the clearance from the top man in each
organization who was likely to kick," Conant recalled, "then
Oppenheimer would approach the man directly and try to sell him on the
idea. If there was reluctance, Groves or I or both of us would then
write a letter to the man in question, telling him just how important
it was for him to make this sacrifice for the war effort."
This appeal was not always successful. As
Oppenheimer told Conant in January 1943, of the men he had approached,
only
Robert Bacher, a Cornell physicist on leave to the MIT Radiation
Laboratory, had agreed to come. Bacher and I.I. Rabi, originally from
Columbia but on loan to the MIT Radiation Laboratory where he was
serving as deputy director, met with Oppenheimer, Edwin McMillan, a
physics professor at UC working at the Berkeley Radiation Laboratory,
and Luis Alvarez, a physics professor at UC on loan to the MIT
Radiation Laboratory, in the Biltmore Hotel in New York City on Jan.
30, 1943, to discuss the problem. When Bacher asked Oppenheimer who
would have final authority over the laboratory, "it took some time to
get it out of him. When we did, when we found out that lab was to be
military, with scientists taking commissions in the Army, we were
horrified," said Bacher.
Rabi and the others agreed that the Laboratory must
demilitarize if the project were to be successful. As Oppenheimer
reported to Conant, they argued that military control would lead to
friction, loss of morale and "more important, that in any issue in
which we were instructed by our military superiors, the whole
Laboratory would be forced to follow their instructions, and thus in
effect lose its scientific autonomy."
Oppenheimer was alarmed that he would not be able to
recruit the men he needed if he ran a militarized laboratory. "In a
tight isolated group such as we are now planning, some warmth and
trust in personal relations is an indispensable prerequisite, and we
are, of course, able to ensure this only in the case of men whom we
have known in the past."
Hans Bethe, Bacher's
colleague at Cornell University, whose summary of nuclear physics in
the Review of Modern Physics had become known as the "Bethe Bible,"
was one such person. Like Bacher, Bethe had worked with Army officers
at MIT on radar projects, and both believed that a military regime
would be too inflexible for the work at hand.
Oppenheimer believed that "the solidarity of the
physicists is such, that if these conditions are not met, we will not
only fail to have the men from MIT with us, but that many men who have
already planned to join the new laboratory will reconsider their
commitments."
Groves and Conant were faced with an impasse. Groves
would not entirely relinquish Army control, but a compromise was
reached: Oppenheimer could tell potential staff that Los Alamos "would
be concerned with the development and final manufacture of an
instrument of war," including "certain experimental studies in
science, engineering and ordnance." However, "at a later date
large-scale experiments involving difficult ordnance procedures and
the handling of highly dangerous material" would be involved, and this
would be a turning point. "During the first period, the laboratory
will be on a strictly civilian basis," it was agreed. However, "when
the second division of the work is entered upon, which will not be
earlier than Jan. 1, 1944, the scientific and engineering staff will
be composed of commissioned officers." The ultimate authority over the
laboratory would be the Military Policy Committee, composed of
Vannevar Bush, head of OSRD; Conant; Groves; Rear Adm. William Purnell
of the Pentagon's Joint Committee on New Weapons and Equipment; and
Gen. Wilhelm Styer, chief of staff of the Army's services of supply.
Groves would represent the committee at Los Alamos,
but Oppenheimer was responsible to Conant as well, and placed in
charge of all scientific work as well as "the maintenance of secrecy
by the civilian personnel under his control."
The compromise mollified the scientists. Bacher
agreed to come and head the Experimental Physics Division of the
laboratory, and simultaneously submitted his resignation, which would
be effective when the laboratory was militarized. Rabi refused to
leave the Radiation Laboratory but served as a consultant to the Los
Alamos laboratory. Bethe came to head the Theoretical Division.
Delayed by his work at Chicago, Fermi did not arrive
until 1944, when he became head of the new Fermi (F) Division.
The challenge of recruiting these senior scientists
prepared Oppenheimer for the task of staffing the Laboratory.
Armed with the Groves-Conant letter, Oppenheimer
crisscrossed the country adding to his team. To Serber, McMillan and
the Berkeley theorists were added Emilio Segre and J.W. Kennedy and
their experimental groups from the Berkeley Radiation Laboratory.
Felix Bloch and Hans Staub and their group came from Stanford;
Marshall Holloway and his group from Purdue University; Victor
Weisskopf from the University of Rochester; Donald Kerst from the
University of Illinois; and E.A. Long from Columbia University. Conant
expedited the transfer of Edward Teller, Robert Christy, Darol Froman
and Alvin Graves from the Metallurgical Laboratory at Columbia.
Government research laboratories also contributed
key personnel: Seth Neddermeyer came from the National Bureau of
Standards and D.R. Inglis came from the Ballistic Research Laboratory
at Aberdeen, Md.
Among those recruited from private laboratories were
Edward Condon from Westinghouse Research Laboratories, Cyril Stanley
Smith from the National Research Council and Charles Critchfield from
the Carnegie Institution of Washington.
Physicians Louis Hempelmann from Barnes Hospital in
St. Louis, Mo., and J.F. Nolan from New York's Memorial Hospital
provided medical expertise.
Despite these successes, of the 33 physicists
Oppenheimer set out to recruit, only 15 came to Los Alamos. John van
Vleck, who had served on the summer study at Berkeley in 1942, when it
was determined that a fission bomb was feasible and a thermonuclear
bomb possible, could not be pried loose from Harvard, despite the fact
that Conant was its president. Franz Kurie of the UC Radiation
Laboratory was not released by Lawrence. Carl Anderson and Wolfgang
Panofsky of the California Institute of Technology were among others
who could not be recruited.
Some refused to remain at Los Alamos. Felix Bloch
resigned to work on radar; E.U. Condon, who came to Los Alamos to
serve as Oppenheimer's deputy, resigned in disagreement with Groves's
compartmentalization policy.
None of these recruits would put on a uniform at Los
Alamos, and although soldiers would play a role in its work, the
laboratory was never militarized.
Groves never raised the issue of converting the
Laboratory to a military organization again. Instead, it was to become
an outpost of academia.
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