|
In early 1943, John Manley, the experimental
physicist from the University of Illinois on assignment to the
Metallurgical Laboratory of the University of Chicago, visited
University of California theoretical physicist J. Robert Oppenheimer,
whom he had been assisting with plans for the new laboratory at Los
Alamos. He had "bugged Oppie for I don't know how many months about an
organization chart who was going to be responsible for this and who
was going to be responsible for that. But one day in January, I
climbed to the top floor of LeConte Hall where Robert had his office
and pushed open the door. Ed Condon (the Westinghouse physicist whom
Oppenheimer had chosen as his deputy director) happened to be in there
with him at the moment, but Oppie practically threw a piece of paper
at me as I came in the door and said, 'Here's your damn organization
chart,' " Manley recounted.
In May 1943, the new Los Alamos Laboratory struggled
to articulate that chart at the small laboratory, which was originally
planned for about 100 physicists but had expanded to a full-fledged
research and development organization. Oppenheimer, who was familiar
with "big science" from Ernest Lawrence's Radiation Laboratory at UC
Berkeley, and Condon, who had directed the large Westinghouse Research
Laboratory, needed an expanded administrative structure for the
Laboratory to respond to a recommendation made by a Manhattan Engineer
District Review Committee that the Laboratory incorporate ordnance and
plutonium refining in their mission.
Oppenheimer had only two administrative officers
besides himself, Condon and W.R. Dennes of UC. The review committee
recommended the appointment of a director of ordnance and engineering,
an associate director to take charge of a major part of the scientific
work and to replace Oppenheimer in his absence, and an administrative
officer to coordinate non-technical administrative functions and act
as liaison to the Army post commander. The last position was filled in
May by David Hawkins, a philosopher from UC.
Condon, however, violently disagreed with the
security arrangements at Los Alamos and believed they would prevent
effective contact with the other parts of the project with which the
Laboratory must coordinate its efforts. He resigned April 26, telling
Oppenheimer that the policy of compartmentalization pursued by the
Manhattan Engineer District "puts you in the position of trying to do
an extremely difficult job with three hands tied behind your back."
MED commander Gen. Leslie R. Groves followed this policy so that
scientific workers at Columbia University, the University of Chicago,
UC Berkeley and other universities were aware only of that part of the
work that they were doing, not of operations elsewhere. Production
workers at Oak Ridge, Tenn., where uranium-235 was separated from
natural ore, and Hanford, Wash., where plutonium was produced in
reactors, had no idea of its purpose. He wanted the same policy
followed within the new laboratory.
There were few professional personnel who could deal
with the administrative problems of a research laboratory. Oppenheimer
never succeeded in replacing Condon and had to be satisfied with
scientists with little administrative experience or administrators
with no scientific background. Dana P. Mitchell of Columbia
University's physics department had been in charge of procurement
there and took charge of it at Los Alamos. Arthur L. Hughes of the
Washington University in St. Louis, and who had chaired the physics
department there, became director of personnel. B.E. Brazier of the
T.H. Buel Co. in Denver, an administrator, was recruited to head
construction and maintenance operations. Hawkins pointed out that
"because of the newness of large-scale organized research, there does
not exist for it a class of professional scientific administrators. In
the main, a choice had to be made between a large administrative
organization staffed with persons unacquainted with the peculiarities
of scientific research and a system by which the major share of
administrative responsibility fell to the scientists themselves. Here
again, it was partly a matter of expediency and partly of policy that
the center of gravity remained in the scientific staff. The policy
adopted meant, especially at the beginning, a gain of unity in the
Laboratory. It entailed, undeniably, a loss of administrative
efficiency," Hawkins said.
The research side of the Laboratory was organized in
divisions that reflected traditional academic disciplines: theoretical
physics under Hans Bethe of Cornell University; experimental physics
under Robert Bacher, also of Cornell; and chemistry and metallurgy
under Joseph Kennedy of UC Berkeley; and Cyril Stanley Smith of the
American Brass Co.
The Theoretical Physics Division had been organized
in March. Edward Teller, who had worked at George Washington
University, Columbia University and as a physicist for the Manhattan
Engineer District at the Metallurgical Laboratory of the University of
Chicago before joining Oppenheimer's summer study of bomb design at
the UC Berkeley in 1942, headed one group; Robert Serber,
Oppenheimer's assistant at Berkeley in 1942 and 1943 after leaving the
University of Illinois, another; Victor Weisskopf of the University of
Rochester in New York, a third; and Richard Feynman of Princeton, a
fourth. Donald A. Flanders of New York University came later in the
summer of 1943 to form a computing group.
The Experimental Physics Division organized shortly
thereafter included Robert R. Wilson of Princeton as head of the
Cyclotron Group; John H. Williams of the University of Minnesota as
head of the Electrostatic Generator Group; Manley as head of the D-D
Source Group; Darol Froman, a professor at the University of Denver
who had worked as a group leader at the Navy's Radio and Sound
Laboratory in San Diego and as a research associate at the
Metallurgical Laboratory, as head of the Electronic Group; and Emilio
Segre' of the UC Radiation Laboratory as head of the Radioactivity
Group. The first three groups had to await the completion of their
accelerator laboratories. Segre' and his associates made preliminary
measurements of spontaneous fission in uranium and plutonium at the
Radiation Laboratory in Berkeley in April and May before transferring
the work to Los Alamos. Froman's group was busy helping to equip the
laboratories.
The Chemistry and Metallurgy Division, which was
enlarged to purify the plutonium that would be produced in production
reactors at the Hanford Engineering Works for use in the bomb, would
require its own large dust-free laboratory. While that was being
built, plutonium research at the Metallurgical Laboratory of the
University of Chicago; the UC Berkeley's chemistry department; and
Iowa State College would have to be coordinated. Charles A. Thomas of
the Monsanto Chemical Co. visited the Laboratory in late May 1943 to
discuss the position. He did not accept it until July. Brazier
designed the new building with his advice.
The new Ordnance Division would be headed by Navy
Capt. William S. Parsons, who did not arrive at Los Alamos until June,
although he made a preliminary visit in May. The division, like all
others at the Laboratory, was divided into groups, and the initial
group leaders were all physicists from universities or civilian
research bureaus: Edwin M. McMillan from UC's Radiation Laboratory;
Kenneth T. Bainbridge of Harvard University's cyclotron laboratory,
Robert B. Brode of UC Berkeley's physics department; and Charles L.
Critchfield and S.H. Neddermeyer from the National Bureau of
Standards. The whole organization was knit together with a governing
board, including Hawkins; the division leaders; and other
administrative staff heads. Oppenheimer intended it to be an advisory
board, but it gradually became a policy-making body to assist in
coordinating the scientific and engineering effort.
Oppenheimer also made use of a coordinating council,
composed of division and group leaders, to communicate with staff
members and exchange information and opinions.
Oppenheimer rejected compartmentalization when he
instituted the Laboratory colloquium in May 1943. Hans Bethe suggested
the establishment of a weekly technical colloquium, and the governing
board placed Teller in charge of the weekly meetings of the staff
members
Groves objected that this was a major security
hazard but Oppenheimer defended it as a tool that could enhance
security by giving staff members a better understanding of the need
for secrecy.
Groves permitted it to maintain morale and unity
among the staff, but forbade discussion of work at other laboratories
and of production schedules.
To emphasize the need for secrecy and enhance
morale, the governing board solicited a letter from President Franklin
D. Roosevelt through the head of the Office of Scientific Research and
Development, Vannevar Bush, underscoring the need for "every
precaution to insure the security of their project" and expressing
satisfaction with their "excellent work" and his confidence in their
"continued wholehearted and unselfish labors." As would other
presidential communications, this encouraged the Los Alamos staff to
press forward despite the restrictions under which they labored.
Copyright Notice
For Scientific and Technical Information Only
Copyright © 1998-2001 The Regents of the University
of California.
For All Information
Unless otherwise indicated, this information has been authored by
an employee or employees of the University of California, operator of
the Los Alamos National Laboratory under Contract No. W-7405-ENG-36
with the U.S. Department of Energy. The U.S. Government has rights to
use, reproduce, and distribute this information. The public may copy
and use this information without charge, provided that this Notice and
any statement of authorship are reproduced on all copies. Neither the
Government nor the University makes any warranty, express or implied,
or assumes any liability or responsibility for the use of this
information.
LOS ALAMOS NATIONAL LABORATORY
An Affirmative Action/Equal Opportunity Employer
|