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October of 1942 found General Groves in Chicago ready to force a
showdown on pile design. Szilard was noisily complaining that
decisions had to be made so that design could move to procurement and
construction. Compton's delay reflected uncertainty of the
superiority of the helium pile and awareness that, engineering studies
could not be definitive until the precise value of "k"
had been established. Some scientists at the Met Lab urged that
a full production pile be built immediately, while others advocated a
multi-step process, perhaps beginning with an externally cooled
reactor as proposed by Enrico Fermi.
The situation was
tailor-made for a man with Groves' temperament. On October 5,
1942, Groves exhorted the Met Lab to decide on final pile design
within a week. Even wrong decisions were better than no
decisions, Groves claimed, and since time was more valuable than
money, more than one approach should be pursued if no single design
stood out. While Groves did not mandate a specific decision, his
imposed deadline forced the Met Lab scientists to reach a consensus.
As expected, Compton
decided on compromise. Fermi would study the fundamentals of
pile operation on a small experimental unit to be completed and in
operation by the end of the year. Hopefully he would be able to
determine the precise value of "k" and make a significant
advance in pile engineering. An intermediate pile with external
cooling would be built at Argonne and operated until June 1, 1943,
when it would be dismantled for plutonium extraction. The
helium-cooled Mae West, designed to produce 100 grams of plutonium a
day, would be built and operating by March 1944. Studies on
liquid-cooled reactors would continue, including Szilard's work with
liquid metals.
While the Met Lab labored
to make headway on pile design, Glenn Seaborg and his co-workers tried
to gain enough information about transuranium chemistry to insure that
plutonium produced could be successfully extracted from the irradiated
uranium. Using lanthanum fluoride as a carrier, Seaborg isolated
a weighable sample of plutonium in August of 1942. At the same
time, Isadore Perlman and William J. Knox explored the peroxide method
of extraction; John E. Willard studied various materials to determine
which best absorbed plutonium; Theodore T. Magel and Daniel K.
Koshland researched solvent-extraction processes; and Harrison S.
Brown and Orville F. Hill performed experiments into volatility
reactions. Basic research on plutonium's chemistry continued as
did work on radiation and fission products.
Seaborg's discovery and
subsequent isolation of plutonium were major events in the history of
chemistry, but, like Fermi's achievement, it remained to be seen
whether they could be translated into a production process useful to
the bomb effort. In fact, Seaborg's challenge seemed even more
daunting, for while "piles" had to be scaled up ten to
twenty times, a plutonium separation plant would involve a scale-up of
the laboratory experiment on the order of a billion-fold.
Collaboration with DuPont's
Charles M. Cooper and his staff on plutonium separation facilities
began even before Seaborg succeeded in isolating a sample of
plutonium. Seaborg was reluctant to drop any of the approaches
then under consideration, and Cooper agreed. The two decided to
pursue all four methods of plutonium separation but put first priority
on the lanthanum fluoride process Seaborg had already developed.
Cooper's staff ran into problems with the lanthanum fluoride method in
late 1942, but by then Seaborg had become interested in phosphate
carriers. Work led by Stanley G. Thompson found that bismuth
phosphate retained over ninety-eight percent plutonium in a
precipitate. With bismuth phosphate as a backup for the
lanthanum fluoride, Cooper moved forward on a semi-works near Stagg
Field at the University of Chicago.
Compton's original plans to
build the experimental pile and chemical separation plant on the
University of Chicago campus changed during the fall of 1942.
The S-1 Executive Committee concurred that it would be safer to put
Fermi's pile at Argonne and build the semi-works (pilot plant) and
separation facilities at Oak Ridge than to place these experiments in
a populous area. On October 3rd, DuPont agreed to design and
build the chemical separation plant. Groves tried to entice
further DuPont participation at Oak Ridge by having the firm prepare
an appraisal of the pile project and by placing three DuPont staff
members on the Lewis Committee. Because DuPont was sensitive
about its public image (the company was still smarting from charges
that it profiteered during World War I), Groves ultimately obtained
the services of the giant chemical company for the sum of one dollar
over actual costs. In addition, DuPont vowed to stay out of the
bomb business after the war and offered all patents to the United
States government.
Groves had done well in
convincing DuPont to join the Manhattan Project. DuPont's proven
administrative structure assured excellent coordination (Crawford
Greenwalt was given the responsibility of coordinating all DuPont and
Met Lab planning), and Groves and Compton welcomed the company's
demand that it be put in full charge of the Oak Ridge plutonium
project. DuPont had a strong organization and had studied every aspect
of the Met Lab's program thoroughly before accepting the
assignment. While deeply involved in the overall war effort,
DuPont expected to be able to divert personnel and other resources
from explosives work in time to throw its full weight into the Oak
Ridge project.

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