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The summer of 1942 proved
to be troublesome for the fledgling bomb project. Col. James C.
Marshall, with the Syracuse, New York Army Corps of Engineers, was
picked to direct the new Laboratory for the Development of Substitute
Metals (DSM). Marshall immediately moved from Syracuse to New
York City where he set up the Manhattan Engineer District, established
by general order on August 13th. Marshall, like most other Army
officers, knew nothing about nuclear physics. Furthermore,
Marshall and his Army superiors were disposed to move
cautiously. In one case, for instance, Marshall delayed purchase
of an excellent production site in Tennessee pending further study,
while the scientists who had been involved in the project from the
start were pressing for immediate purchase.
While Bush had carefully
managed the transition to Army control, there was not yet a mechanism
to arbitrate disagreement between the S-1 Executive Committee and the
military. The resulting lack of coordination complicated
attempts to gain a higher priority for scarce materials and boded ill
for the future of the entire bomb project.
New decisions made in
September provided administrative clarity and renewed the project's
sense of urgency. Both Bush and the Army agreed that an officer
other than Marshall should be given the assignment of overseeing the
entire atomic project, which by now was commonly referred to as the
Manhattan Project.
On September 17, 1942, the
Army appointed Colonel Leslie R. Groves (promoted to Brigadier General
six days later) to head the effort. Groves was an engineer with
impressive credentials, including supervising the construction of the
Pentagon, and, more importantly, had strong administrative
abilities. Within two days Groves acted to obtain the Tennessee
site and secured a higher priority rating for project materials.
In addition, Groves moved the Manhattan Engineer District headquarters
from New York to Washington. He quickly recognized the talents
of Marshall's deputy, Col. Kenneth D. Nichols, and arranged for
Nichols to work as his chief aide and troubleshooter throughout the
war.
Bush, with the help and
authority of Secretary of War Henry Stimson, set up a new Military
Policy Committee (MPC), including one representative each from the
Army, the Navy, and the Office of Scientific Research and Development
(OSRD). Bush hoped that scientists would have better access to
decision making in the new structure than they enjoyed when DSM and
S-1 operated as parallel but separate units. With Groves in
overall command (Marshall remained as District Engineer, where his
cautious nature proved useful in later decision making) and the
Military Policy Committee in place (the Top Policy Group retained
broad policy authority), Bush felt that early organizational
deficiencies had been remedied.
During the summer and fall
of 1942 technical and administrative difficulties were still
severe. Each of the four isotope separation processes remained
under consideration, but a full-scale commitment to all four posed
serious problems even with the project's high priority. When
Groves took command in mid-September, he made it clear that by late
1942 decisions would be made as to which process or processes promised
to produce a bomb in the shortest amount of time. The exigencies
of war, Groves held, required scientists to move from laboratory
research to development and production in record time. Though
traditional scientific caution might be short-circuited in the
process, there was no alternative if a bomb was to be built in time to
be used in the current conflict. As everyone involved in the
Manhattan Project soon learned, Groves never lost sight of this goal
and made all his decisions accordingly.
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